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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this paper is to identify a method to create 
a balance between competition laws and the patent 
protection regime so as to promote innovation. The 
relationship between competition law and the law 
relating to intellectual property has long been recognized 
to be a turbulent one. The traditional perspective adopted 
towards the relationship between the subjects is that one 
is opposed to the other; where intellectual property laws 
encourage and protect monopoly, competition laws seek 
to curb and control it. This research focuses on the 
possibility of change from the conventional view relating 
to competition law and intellectual property law by 
making the approach to these two subjects more 
innovation centric. The paper examines these apparently 
paradoxical disciplines from the perspective of innovation 
and finds that both intellectual property laws and 
competition laws have a common objective, which is to 
increase innovation.  This paper undertakes conceptual 
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research in order to develop new concepts and to re-
interpret the existing ones. It analyses various economic 
theories of development and the existing conceptual 
framework pertaining to competition and patent laws.  
Finally, the paper suggests amendments in the existing 
law and proposes a new legal and policy framework that 
reconciles both the fields so as to promote effective 
innovation crucial for economic development and trade in 
India. 
Keywords: Competition, Economic Theory, Innovation, Intellectual 
Property, Patents. 
The Patent-Competition Paradox 
There is a close link between patent rights and competition laws. 
While patent laws may contribute to fair market behaviour by 
ensuring prevention of copying or imitation of patented goods, 
competition laws limit patent rights, in that patent holders are 
barred from abusing their rights.1 The patent system is based on the 
concept of exclusion, while competition laws are contemptuous of 
exclusivity. Hence, the patent-competition paradox attains 
relevance.  
Nevertheless, the relationship between intellectual property rights 
and competition law is not pure but contradictory. Both 
competition and patent policies, if properly balanced, foster 
innovation. Competition law does so by protecting competition, 
and patent law, by promoting dynamic innovation along multiple 
                                                          
1 World Intellectual Property Organization, Competition and Patents, 
WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION, available at 
http://www.wipo.int/patent-law/en/developments/competition.html. 
(last visited on Apr. 23, 2015). 
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dimensions.2 Failure to strike such a balance, however, can 
adversely affect innovation.3 
The Role of Intellectual Property in Innovation 
The general perception regarding patent law is that it enhances and 
encourages innovation by acting as an incentivizing mechanism, 
and thereby promotes economic growth. It has been statistically 
proven that patents produce a higher and more certain investment 
return on innovation, thus validating investments in research and 
development.4 The theory that patents motivate useful inventions is 
one of the more perceptible benefits of the concept of granting 
patents. This theory is based on the presumption that the absence 
of a patent system would mean that there would be no incentives 
for innovation. Patent protection results in competitive research 
and development (R & D), where firms invest their resources in 
research facilities with the by-product being innovation.  
But there is another, much grimmer side to granting patent 
monopoly over innovations. Too many firms could invest their 
resources in R&D leading to an inordinate number of entities 
stampeding towards the same goal.  
Larger firms holding patents tend to discourage smaller firms from 
venturing into the protected field for fear of adverse litigation. This 
in turn, will result in the reduction of innovative and inventive 
                                                          
2 Professor Greg Dolin, Resolving the Patent-Antitrust Paradox: Promoting 
Consumer Welfare Through Innovation,CENTRE FOR PROTECTION OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY-GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
(May, 2013), http://cpip.gmu.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/Dolin-
Patent-Antitrust-Paradox.pdf. 
3 Susan S. DeSantet. al., To Promote Innovation: The Proper Balance of 
Competition and Patent Law and Policy, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (Oct., 
2003), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-
innovation-proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-
policy/innovationrpt.pdf. 
4 Bruce Nolan, The Experts: Does the Patent System Encourage Innovation, 
WSJ, (May 16, 2013), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/ 
SB10001424127887323582904578487200821421958. 
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efforts, which could have yielded in the production of 
supplementary products as well as enhanced the protected 
product.  
Sometimes patent holders may obtain protection and monopoly for 
their inventions and then, either not put such innovation to any 
use, or not harness the full potential of such innovation. Due to the 
protection afforded by patents, no other entity can make use of 
such innovation till the patent on it expires. By such time, the 
effectiveness or utility of the innovation would have become 
obsolete. 
In certain industries, patents play a negligible role as a means of 
protection of invention, or even, to take an extreme point of view, 
be considered to hamper innovation. This is observed especially in 
cases of emerging technological areas where the patents protect 
foundational inventions on which others as based, thus cordoning 
off vast areas of information and knowledge, which otherwise 
could have been harnessed for further research and development.5 
Thus, granting absolute monopoly over an invention may not 
always be the best course for innovation from the point of view of 
the public. 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) in the Competition Act, 2002 
Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 prevents any business 
activity that is likely to cause an „appreciable adverse effect‟ on 
competition in India. Section 3(5) has bestowed an exemption on 
intellectual property (IP). This exemption, however, does not go 
completely unchecked as Section 4 of the Act deals with the abuse 
of dominant position, and provides ample room for interfering 
with intellectual property matters as well.6 There are only a few 
                                                          
5 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Patents and 
Innovation: Trends and Policy Challenges, OECD, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/science/sci-tech/24508541.pdf (last visited on Apr. 
28, 2015). 
6 K. D. Raju, The Inevitable Connection between Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law: Emerging Jurisprudence and Lessons for India, 18 J. INTELL. 
PROP. L. 111, 114 (2013). 
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provisions that deal with intellectual property in the whole of the 
Competition Act, 2002. Considering the massive impact these fields 
have on each other, more comprehensive legislations regarding the 
IPR - competition law interface are essential. 
The Concept of Dynamic Competition 
Static competition manifests itself in the form of existing products 
offered at low prices. According to this model, no new products are 
introduced, and rapid price reductions driven by innovation do not 
exist.7 While this static framework has a theoretical simplicity and 
elegance, it tends to overlook industrial dynamics.8 For these 
reasons, it is not a recognizable state of world. The concept of 
„dynamic competition‟ has been variously defined. Some theorists 
argue that the dynamic competition models entail the prediction of 
future competitive outcomes, while others have observed that 
„dynamic is shorthand for a variety of rigorously competitive 
activities such as significant product differentiation and rapid 
response to change, whether from innovation or simply new 
market opportunities ensuing from changes in „taste‟ or other 
forces of disequilibrium.‟ Dynamic analysts tend to „view 
competition through a broader lens and focus less on outcomes and 
more on processes.‟9 Dynamic competition is, in fact, more intuitive 
and much closer to the conventional view of competition, than the 
stylized notion of static competition routinely depicted in 
textbooks.10 
When a concept of dynamic competition is developed, the 
economic rationale of intellectual property rights must be taken 
into account, and any conduct that is the result of intellectual 
                                                          
7 David J. Teece, Favouring Dynamic over Static Competition: Implications for 
Antitrust Analysis and Policy, INNOVATION FORUM-GMU (May 15, 2008), 
http://innovationforum.gmu.edu/2008/papers/dynamic_static.pdf. 
8 Gregory Sidak and David J. Teece, Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law, 
5(4)  JCLE 581, 631 (2009). 
9 J GREGORY SIDAK AND DAVID TEECE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
COMPETITION LAW AND ECONOMICS IN ASIA 70 ( R. Ian McEwin, 2011). 
10 Sidak & Teece, supra  note 8. 
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property law must be recognised as pro-competitive to the extent 
that it lies within the common economic rationale of IP and 
competition law.11 Unfortunately, this intersection between the two 
branches of law remains a grey area. 
In today‟s technology driven world, innovation is crucial to 
success. Innovation leads to new products and production 
technologies. It allows new firms to enter into markets dominated 
by incumbents, and is critical for incumbent firms who want to 
continue their previous market successes and stimulate consumer 
demand. Competition drives innovation. Without competition, 
there would be little pressure to introduce new products or new 
production methods and the economy would lag behind, thus 
losing international competitiveness.12 Using static analysis to 
address antitrust issues in a dynamic economy is unlikely to 
improve consumer welfare. A more dynamic analytical framework 
increases the likelihood of helping rather than hurting consumers.13 
Various theorists support the proposition that dynamic competition 
is the way towards increasing innovation. Joseph Schumpeter14 was 
a strong advocate of the dynamic theory of competition. 
Schumpeter‟s main objective was to set up a dynamic framework to 
stand alongside and complement the static one.15 Schumpeterian 
                                                          
11 OLAV KOLSTSTAD, COMPETITION LAW AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS – OUTLINE OF ECONOMICS – BASED APPROACH, RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND COMPETITION LAW 10 (Josef 
Drexl, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2008). 
12 William J. Kolasky, The Role of Competition in Promoting Dynamic Markets 
and Economic Growth, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (Nov. 12, 2002), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/200484.htm. 
13 SIDAK & TEECE Supra  note 8, p. 585 . 
14 Joseph Alois Schumpeter, an Austrian-American, was one of the most 
influential economists and political scientists of the 20th Century. He 
analysed and popularised the term “creative destruction” and 
propounded a theory which revolutionized the approach to economics 
and innovation- the Schumpeterian theory of economics. 
15 JOHN A. MATHEWS, REFLECTIONS ON SCHUMPETER‟S LOST SEVENTH 
CHAPTER TO THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, ELGAR COMPANION 
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competition is engendered by product and process innovation. 
Such competition does more than bringing price competition; it 
tends to overturn the existing order. A framework for antitrust 
analysis that favours dynamic competition over static competition 
would place less weight on market share and concentration in the 
assessment of market power and more weight on assessing 
innovation and enterprise level capabilities.16 
Further evidence that innovation is a natural result of competition 
was given by Schmookler,17 who demonstrated that the appearance 
of clusters of patents in various industries after major productive 
investment in those industries showed that invention and 
innovation were generally demand led and not technology led.18 
While Schumpeterian competition drives innovation, it also begets 
imitators and swarms of those who copy their rival‟s innovation, 
attracting investment and leading to a boom. When the original 
innovator‟s profit advantage is eliminated, investment moves 
elsewhere and the sector may even shrink, until the next disruptive 
innovation restarts the cycle.19 
Neo-Schumpeterian economics modifies the Schumpeterian theory 
slightly seeking to get a grip on the dynamic phenomena of 
                                                                                                                                    
TO NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS 81 (Horst Hanusch and Andreas 
Pyka, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007). 
16 Sidak, Gregory and Teece, David, Rewriting the Horizontal Merger 
Guidelines in the Name of Dynamic Competition, 16 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 
885,885 (2009). 
17 Jacob Schmookler was an American economist who is best known as 
the first economist to successfully explore statistically, the economics of 
technological innovation at the industrial level, in great detail. 
18 CHRIS FREEMAN, A SCHUMPETERIAN RENAISSANCE?: ELGAR COMPANION 
TO NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS 134 (Horst Hanusch and Andreas 
Pyka, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007). 
19 Thomas C. Leonard, Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative 
Destruction, PRINCETON. EDU (Apr. 28, 2015), 
https://www.princeton.edu/~tleonard/papers/McCraw.pdf. 
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economic reality.20 In the Neo-Schumpeterian approach, innovation 
competition takes the place of price competition as the coordination 
mechanism of interest, thus propelling economic dynamics.21 While 
prices only concern the adjustment to limiting conditions, 
innovations overcome such limitations and establish a new order. 
Another influential 20th century economist, Kenneth Arrow,22 re-
emphasized the fact that competition, rather than monopoly, 
promotes innovation.23 He observed that monopolists bear a cost 
while innovating, which a competitor may not incur. Monopolists 
give up the opportunity in order to continue earning monopoly 
profits without innovating. In consequence, the incremental gains 
enjoyed from innovation by the monopolist may be less than those 
of a firm in a competitive setting that would expect to earn similar 
post-innovation profits.24 
Thus, all these theories result in the same inference, i.e. competition 
promotes innovation, which is the hallmark of development.  
Dynamic Competition in the Indian Economy 
Post-independence, Indian socialism systematically restricted and 
eliminated competition in many sectors of the Indian economy.25 
However, in the early 1980‟s, there was a shift towards 
liberalisation and economic reform. India adopted economic 
                                                          
20 HORST HANUSH AND ANDREAS PYKA, INTRODUCTIONS, ELGAR 
COMPANION TO NEO-SCHUMPETERIAN ECONOMICS 1 (Horst Hanusch and 
Andreas Pyka, Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2007). 
21 Id. 
22 (A Nobel Prize-winning economist who has taught at Stanford and 
Harvard.) 
23 Jonathan B. Baker, Beyond Schumpeter vs. Arrow: How Antitrust Fosters 
Innovation, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 575, 578 (2007). 
24 Id. 
25 Arvind Virmani, The Dynamics of Competition: Phasing of Domestic and 
External Liberalisation in India, PLANNING COMMISSION (Apr., 2006), 
http://planningcommission.nic.in/reports/wrkpapers/wp_dc_pdel.pdf. 
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reforms in order to create a competitive environment for 
stimulating growth and competitiveness.26 
In the financial year 2015, the Indian GDP is poised to increase to 
7.4 % (advanced estimates).27 The Indian market is in a constant 
state of evolution due to globalization and liberalization and a 
stagnant competition policy cannot cater to such an economy. 
Recent literature emphasizes the importance of dynamic efficiency 
as a legitimate objective of competition policy. This is often 
associated with the benefits arising from technological change, 
learning and economic growth accumulated over time.28 It has thus 
been made amply clear that competition law enforcers should 
emphasize their focus on protecting the dynamic „process of 
competition‟ and not on the „outcome‟ in terms of uncertain future 
consumer preferences.29 
The Constitution of India30 mandates, inter alia, that the State shall 
direct its policy towards ensuring that the ownership and control of 
material resources of the community are so distributed as best to 
subserve the common good; and that the operation of the economic 
system does not result in the concentration of wealth and means of 
production to the common detriment.31 
                                                          
26 Vikram Chadha and Navdeep Kumar, Impact of India’s New Competition 
Policy on the Competitiveness of the Indian Industry, 2 WORLD REVIEW OF 
BUSINESS RESEARCH 120, 121 (2012). 
27 Ministry of Finance, PRESS INFORMATION BUREAU, 
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, Budget 2015-16, (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://pib.nic.in/budget2015/ecosurveyRel.aspx.  
28 Rafaelita M. Aldaba, Emerging Issues in Promoting Competition Policy 
under Regional Frameworks, 2 PIDS DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (2008), (Jan. 
,2008), http://dirp4.pids.gov.ph/ris/dps/pidsdps0802.pdf. 
29 FICCI IPR Division, Indo-German Conference on Intellectual Property 
Rights, FICCI,  (Mar. 10-11, 2011), http://www.kas.de/wf/ doc/ 
kas_30136-1522-1-30.pdf?120208121353. 
30 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Art. 38 and Art.39. 
31 Dr. S. Chakravarthy, Why India Adopted a New Competition Law, CUTS 
INTERNATIONAL, (Aug. 2006), http://www.cuts-international.org/ 
pdf/wiancl.pdf. 
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Furthermore, the Competition Act, 2002 anticipates 
implementation of competition law in a dynamic framework of 
innovation and growth as it dwells on the benefits of competition 
law, as a stamp of approval on achieving market oriented economic 
development.32 There is a need to ensure that competition 
authorities get it right and that the dynamism of the market is also 
not sapped of its competitive vigour on account of over 
enthusiasm. 
Interdependent Nature of Competition and Patents: Perceived 
Differences between the Two Fields 
The intersection between intellectual property law and competition 
law has been studied in great detail, with some observers focusing 
on the presupposed „tension‟ between these two bodies of law. Carl 
Shapiro33 in his works on the subject has stated that there is no 
need for any such tension if antitrust law properly recognizes the 
importance of providing incentives, along with the necessary 
flexibility, for industry participants to conduct research, engage in 
product development and diffuse the resulting innovations widely 
in the marketplace. An example to the contrary would be the fact 
that in spite of Section 3(5) (i) of the Competition Act, 2002,34 
                                                          
32 Dr.GeetaGouri, Making Markets Work Effectively in India Experience of the 
Competition Commission, JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, (Apr. 30, 2015), 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/cprc/koukai/sympo/2012notice.files/130222sym
po3.pdf. 
33 Carl Shapiro is the Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy in the 
Haas School of Business at the University of California at Berkeley. 
Shapiro had the honor of serving as a Member of the President‟s Council 
of Economic Advisers during 2011-12. He has been Editor and Co-Editor 
of the Journal of Economic Perspectives and a Fellow at the Center for 
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences, among other honors. Shapiro 
earned his PhD in Economics at M.I.T. in 1981, taught at Princeton 
University during the 1980s. 
34 The right of any person to restrain any infringement of, or to impose 
reasonable conditions, as may be necessary for protecting any of his rights 
which have been or may be conferred upon him under- 
 (a) the Copyright Act, 1957 (14 of 1957); 
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authorities have prohibited certain activities of intellectual property 
owners which, though lawful under IPR legislations, contravene 
some of the competition law provisions.35 
IP laws recognizing a certain degree of competition could also 
greatly contribute in diffusing this perceived tension. Intellectual 
property rights give innovators the financial incentive to undertake 
the risks of dynamic competition. Additionally, licensing freedom 
permits innovators to find the royalties that will reward them and 
the most efficient co-producers, that can bring products to 
consumers; and the recognition that IP rights do not presumptively 
create market power, helps to ensure that successful innovators 
will not be bogged down by rivals who misuse the competition 
laws to force compulsory licenses or other erosions of IP rights.  
Inherent Similarity of Goals 
Dynamic efficiency is the hallmark of growth oriented economies.36 
Embracing dynamic competition eases the tension between 
intellectual property and antitrust concerns. The patent system 
provides some amount of exclusion and such exclusion is required 
to foster innovation, particularly in more competitive market 
                                                                                                                                    
 (b) the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970); 
 (c) the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958 (43 of 1958) or the Trade 
Marks Act, 1999 (47 of 1999); 
(d) the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) 
Act, 1999 (48 of 1999); 
(e) the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000); 
(f) the Semi-conductor Integrated Circuits Layout-Design Act, 2000 (37 of 
2000). 
35 RAJU, Supra note 6.  
36 Gerald F. Masoudi, Intellectual Property and Competition: Four Principles 
For Encouraging Innovation, DIGITAL AMERICAS 2006 MEETING, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL WORLD, 
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, (Apr. 11, 2006), 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/215645.html. 
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environments.37 IPR and competition law both promote dynamic 
efficiency, i.e., a system of property rights and market rules that 
create appropriate incentives for invention, innovation and the 
risks involved in R&D.38 Whether competition law intervenes and 
restrains IPR is still a matter of deliberation. 
With coordination between patent offices and the competition 
authority, mitigating the adverse effect of strong intellectual 
property rights regimes would become a possibility.
39
 
The primary aim of intellectual property rights is to protect and 
incentivise innovation as well as to grant monopoly rights over the 
invention in question for a limited period of time and the aim of the 
competition policies of various countries are generally to ensure fair 
competition in the market by way of regulatory mechanisms. They 
are not intended to create restrictions or constraints that may be 
detrimental to the growth of the society. Intellectual property laws 
per se are not abusive of competition, however, they may be applied 
to this effect. For example, companies, by refraining from licensing 
their intellectual property to competitors, may undermine the basic 
tenets of competition law as well as the spirit of intellectual 
protection.
40
 
Competition law has traditionally focussed on static competition 
and the allocation of resources, accounting for the effects of 
dynamic competition and dynamic efficiency. Even if competition 
and IP legislations share a common goal, the supremacy of static 
efficiency in practice has created a conflict.
41
 Thus, a shift in focus 
to a more dynamic view on competition is essential. 
                                                          
37 SIDAK & TEECE, Supra note 8. 
38 RAJU, supra note 6. 
39 Pradeep S. Mehta & Ujjwal Kumar, Competition Policy and the Poor, CUTS 
CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE, ECONOMICS & ENVIRONMENT,( Apr. 2, 
2015), http://www.cuts-international.org/viewpoint.html. 
40 RAJU, supra note 6. 
41 JOSEF DREXL, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND 
COMPETITION LAW (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2008). 
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IP protection provides incentives for innovation and technological 
diffusion, which in themselves are important sources of competition 
in the marketplace and therefore support competition. Similarly, 
competition stimulates innovation, thereby contributing to the 
development of intellectual property. Competition law protects 
incentives to innovate from anti-competitive conduct that would 
create, enhance or maintain market power or otherwise cause 
vigorous rivalry among firms.
42
 
In sum, the argument is that there is no conflict in the ends being 
sought by intellectual property rights and competition law though 
there may be some differences in the means through which these 
goals are sought to be achieved. In both cases, the promotion of 
innovation, consumer welfare and more product choices
43
 is the 
common aim.  
A Nationwide Approach to Innovation 
A nationwide approach to innovation is more beneficial than an 
industry wise approach, as a national framework for innovation is 
much more than just a network of institutions supporting research 
and development. 
Given that there is a positive relationship between competition 
policy and productivity as also investment and export 
performance, an effective innovation approach fostering a flexible, 
dynamic and competitive industrial sector would lead a country to 
sustained development. An innovative market is one of the best 
ways to stimulate productivity.44 Studies conducted by the World 
Bank reveal that economies with greater competition have higher 
levels of economic growth and enhanced productivity. 
What is required is a comprehensive Neo-Schumpeterian economic 
theory focussing on innovation driven qualitative development and 
                                                          
42 Rishika Sugandh & Siddhartha Srivastava, Interface Between Intellectual 
Property Rights and Competition Law: Indian Jurisprudence, 1(2) IJLLJS (2014).  
43 Abhishek Adlakha, Intellectual Property and Competition Law: The 
Innovation Nexus, 4 CIRC ISSUE, (Sep. 2, 2014),  http://circ.in/pdf/ 
Intellectual_Property_and_Competition_Law-The_Innovation_Nexus.pdf. 
44 VIRMANI, supra note 25. 
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offering theoretical concepts to analyze the various issues of three 
sectors: Industry, Finance and Public Sector.45 
A Neo-Schumpeterian approach will give a complete picture of 
what is required for radical innovation resulting in growth. Such an 
attitude adopted towards the market and economy will place 
importance on making policies, keeping in view that while the vast 
majority of firms do not make radical innovations, everyone can 
make incremental innovations by adopting new products and 
processes made by others.46 There will be a shift in emphasis 
towards diffusion across India. 
Thus, as it persuades innovation, while factoring in a wider range 
of aspects other than the traditional Schumpeterian theory, a Neo-
Schumpeterian approach is apposite for the volatile Indian market 
scenario. 
Towards a Legislation Best Suited for the Indian Market 
The essential feature of India‟s economic system can be identified 
as a dynamic transformation process of industrial networks, in 
which entrepreneurship and innovation play key roles. A solid 
competition regime and an independent system of enforcing 
provisions to aid innovation are essential to economic development 
and to the welfare of the society, in a developing country like India. 
Developing economies have made great strides in the last century 
in promoting the rule of law and the basics of market economics, 
but these are not necessarily enough to fuel robust growth. These 
factors create the right conditions for static efficiency. However, 
only predictable and enforceable intellectual property rights will 
create the ideal conditions for dynamic efficiency to flourish. It is 
apparent that creating a dynamic private market with strong IP 
                                                          
45 Horst Hanusch & Andreas Pyka, A Roadmap to Neo-Schumpeterian 
Economics, UNIVERSITY OF AUGSBURG, (Jul., 2005), 
http://www.uq.edu.au/economics/PDF/int/Hanusch&Pyka.pdf. 
46 C.S. Sundaresan, Realism and Applied Economics- An Analysis of Growth 
Theories from Neo-Schumpeterian to Neo-Keynesian, ICOAE-2009, (May 27, 
2009), http://kastoria.teikoz.gr/icoae2/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/ 
articles/2011/10/062-2009.pdf. 
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rights is the most efficient way to drive economic growth, as 
private and individual decisions tend to be quicker, more varied, 
and more directly responsive to consumer demands than 
government decisions are.47 
An innovation policy will play a key role in fostering dynamic 
markets and in stimulating economic growth. International 
competitiveness of industries depends on access to inexpensive 
inputs, improvements in efficiency and productivity, all of which 
would find favour with the promotion of innovation. A well 
constructed statute on innovation, backed by an enforcement 
agency with strong powers and an economically sound 
enforcement policy is critical in order for the markets to deliver the 
economic growth that they promise.48 
By embedding recent developments in evolutionary economics, the 
behavioural theory of the firm and strategic management into 
antitrust analysis, one can develop a more robust framework to 
promote innovation. Such a framework will most likely be 
instrumental towards reducing the gap between the fields and also 
the dependence on the standard tools of antitrust economics; 
particularly when the business environment manifests rapid 
technological change, which is  a major stumbling block for both IP 
and competition regimes.49 
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) defines innovation as „new products, business processes 
and organic changes that create wealth or social welfare.‟ Richard 
Lyons, the Chief Learning Officer at Goldman Sachs, offers a more 
condensed version as „fresh thinking that creates value.‟ These 
definitions are the foundation on which deliberations have been 
based. 
                                                          
47 RAJU, supra note 6. 
48 KOLSTSTAD, supra note 11. 
49 SIDAK & TEECE, supra note 8. 
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To enable innovation in India, a recent World Bank report suggests 
a three pronged strategy:50 
Firstly, increasing competition as part of efforts to 
improve the investment climate, supported by 
stronger skills, better information infrastructure and 
more finance, both public and private. 
Secondly, strengthening efforts to create and 
commercialize knowledge as well as adopting better 
methods to diffuse existing global and local 
knowledge and increasing the capacity of smaller 
enterprises to absorb it. If all enterprises could, 
without cost, achieve national practices based on 
knowledge already in use in India, economic output 
could more than quintuple. 
Thirdly, fostering more inclusive innovation by 
promoting formal R&D efforts for the economically 
less privileged thereby facilitating the development 
of creative grassroots efforts and by improving the 
ability of informal enterprises to exploit pre-existing 
knowledge.  
A Critique of the National Innovation (Draft) Act 2008 
The Department of Science and Technology has introduced „The 
National Innovation (Draft) Act‟ (the Act) in 2008.51The proposed 
legislation aims at giving a push to innovation by exploiting 
technology and compensating for the lack of innovation oriented 
provisions in the current Patents Act, 2005.52 
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The term „innovation‟ has been defined in the proposed Act to 
include only those processes that are directed towards achieving 
technical/ technological advances and such innovations as are 
different from any new or innovative technology that was achieved 
as a by-product of such innovation. Further, any product or process 
arising out of innovation, protected by any already existing 
legislation on IPR, will not fall under the ambit of the present 
statute. Thus, such product or process, though falling under the 
theoretical definition of innovation, will not avail any of the 
benefits from the proposed Act. The definition makes no reference 
to social welfare or public interest. There is no explicit mention of 
organic changes leading to the conclusion that the definition of the 
term „innovation‟ is in dire need of revision. 
Currently, there is no correlation between the title of the Act and 
the object and purpose that it seeks to achieve. The title of the Act 
reads „The National Innovation Act, 2008‟ and it names among its 
objectives the amendment and consolidation of laws relating to 
confidential information and the protection of trade secrets in 
India. Here the Act tries to address two dissimilar issues. While the 
title implies that the Act deals only with innovation and other 
allied issues, the body of the legislation combines this with 
different subject matters, namely confidential information and 
trade secrets. Therefore, while the title implies one issue, the 
provisions under the Act discuss another issue resulting in a 
mismatch of title, object and provisions.53 The structure of the Act 
has the features of an intellectual property policy on innovation 
rather than a proposed legislation relating to innovation per se. 
There is a need to consolidate the differences between the Patents 
Act, 2005 and the Competition Act, 2002 by means of an Innovation 
Act and not merely supplementing the existing intellectual 
property law. 
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Conclusion and Suggestions 
1. The Indian legislations on innovation and competition must 
incorporate aspects of dynamic analysis into their 
provisions. Dynamic analysis views competition through a 
broader lens and focuses less on outcomes and more on the 
process. It favours maintaining rivalry but also protects 
property, including intellectual property. The working 
assumption in dynamic competition analysis is that 
intellectual property rights are desirable institutional or 
legal arrangements providing necessary appropriability 
mechanisms to advance and incentivize innovation. 
Dynamic analysis also recognizes that the benefits of 
dynamic competition do not arrive immediately; firms may 
need to tolerate some short term inefficiency to support 
innovation.54 
2. For reasons of promoting dynamic competition, developing 
countries should require rapid publication of patent 
applications with full disclosure of the technical processes 
involved in producing the inventions and in reducing them 
to commercial practice. This would encourage local firms to 
invent patents and use the disclosed knowledge to improve 
their manufacturing methods. This will also serve to 
prevent an applicant‟s competitor from investing 
substantially in a product, only to learn, once the patent is 
finally issued, that it infringed a rival‟s patent and that he 
now owes them significant royalties. Countries with a 
registration system should permit active opposition after 
grants are made, in order to invalidate inappropriately 
awarded patents. Those countries that undertake 
examination could permit pre-grant opposition.55 
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3. The definition of „abuse of patents‟ ought to be „the 
unjustifiable use of the IPRs causing damage to the interest 
of the consumers and the society at large.‟56 
4. The merger guidelines should be properly implemented to 
avoid concentration of intellectual property in IPR rich 
companies to ensure the equitable distribution of patents.57  
5. Holding of a patent is important only for the assessment of 
market power in case the patented technology confers a 
significant competitive advantage on the patent holder.58 
Many patents merely allow their owners to differentiate 
their products or enjoy a slight cost advantage, not enough 
to create genuine antitrust market power.59 Thus, the 
Innovation Act should strive to negate the presumption of 
market power created by patents. 
6. The acquisition of intellectual property rights with the 
purpose of strengthening monopoly power in the market 
should be regulated properly, with clear technology transfer 
guidelines incorporated in the Act.60 
7. An exercise of harmonisation by virtue of the Innovation 
Act is necessary to undo the overriding effect of Section 60 
of the Competition Act over the Patents Act. 
8. An administrative procedure should be created to evaluate 
cooperative arrangements among firms with higher market 
shares for their dynamic efficiency gains and anti-
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competitive nature. Processes should be such as to result in 
sufficient incentives for regulatory bodies to detect and 
prove cases of abusive cooperative arrangements. Pro-
competitive arrangements can be certified to pre-empt 
antitrust litigation in future.61 
The traditional view that IPR laws and competition laws are 
contradictory is a misconception. The National Innovation (Draft) 
Act seeks to harmonize the two legislations. However, there is 
scope for improvement to this piece of legislation and since it has 
not yet been implemented it remains to be seen whether this 
legislation will result in the promotion and growth of innovation. 
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